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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELODY LEETHAM, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. No. 19250 
RICHARD D. LEETHAM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns that portion of the 
trial court's Decree of Divorce which grants cus-
tody of the parties' minor daughter to the Respon-
dent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed an action for divorce 
on or about May 10, 1982. Following trial of the 
matter on April 14, 1983, the Honorable Scott 
Daniels awarded respondent the permanent care, cus-
tody and control of the parties' two-year-old 
daughter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the trial 
court's award of permanent custody to Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent and Appellant were married to 
one another on October 1, 1979. There was one child 
born as issue of the marriage, Kacie Lynn Leetham, 
born May 24, 1980. Respondent had a son, Chris 
Worthington, by a former marriage; Chris was about 
two and one-half when Kacie was born. (Tr.4) 
Respondent filed for divorce from Appel-
lant for the second time in May 1982 and was awarded 
temporary custody of Kacie. (Eval.) Respondent had 
had temporary custody of Kacie for almost one year 
at the time of trial on April 14, 1983. (Eval., Tr. 
5 and 26) Respondent had taken a voluntary lay off 
from her job as a laborer at Amax Specialty Metals in 
October 1982 to spend more time with her two children 
and because she expected to be rehired within ninety 
days when business improved. (Eval., Tr. 22-23) Re-
spondent had been unemployed and at home with her two 
children six months at the time of trial. (Tr. 66) 
Appellant had been paying Respondent $75.00 per month 
as temporary child support for Kacie. (Tr. 5) 
Appellant had a history of psychiatric 
problems related to drug abuse. Appellant had been 
seeing a psychiatrist while dating Respondent. Ap-
pellant was hospitalized on the psychiatric ward 
at St. Mark's Hospital when Respondent was preg-
2 
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11nr•r 1-1i l h Kd<' Ii:- Appellant blamed Respondent for 
ti' 1' r' dd Pins 1 E.va l. ) The evaluator observed that 
L 1 .• eernPo to hE' an effort for Appellant to keep his 
··roi <.:e and emotions under control. (Eval.) Appel-
lant testified at trial that he had been involved 
with drugs, but not within the past year. (Tr. 49) 
Appellant admitted at trial that he had understated 
his monthly income by 50% in the financial declaration 
he submitted to the trial court. (Tr. 32-36) The 
testimony Appellant's mother gave regarding Appel-
lant's board, room and incidental expenses varied 
from the figures Appellant had claimed in his finan-
cial declaration. (Tr. 52-53) 
When Kacie was about six weeks old, Appel-
lant beat Chris for wetting the bed. Respondent pro-
tested; Appellant struck Respondent; Appellant took 
che tiny baby and left. Respondent reconciled with 
Appellant at that time only because she couldn't 
~ear to be separated from her six-week-old baby daugh-
ter. Appellant continued to threaten he would take 
Kacie awav from Respondent. !Eva!.) 
Counsel for the parties stipulated to the 
admission of the child custody evaluation performed by 
Jo,re Htgash1. The trial court noted that it had had 
a hance Lo read the evaluation quite thoroughly before 
the hearing. !Tr. 651 The evaluator observed in the 
1epc•rt that perhaps Respondent was overly alert to her 
3 
children's behavior. The evdluator also observed 
that Respondent had a close, affectionate relation-
ship with her children and recommended that Respon-
dent be awarded permanent custody of Kacie. The 
evaluator noted that if further psychological evalu-
ation of Respondent appeared warranted, the trial 
court could order such evaluation. The trial court 
did not order that Respondent be evaluated further. 
Appellant had been employed at Utah Marble-
head Lime since September 1977. Appellant was the 
union president at Utah Marblehead Lime and attended 
Trade Tech College two times a week. (Eval., Tr. 41) 
Appellant intended to continue to reside with his 
parents and siblings, although he testified it was a 
possibility he might remarry and move out. (Tr.37) 
Appellant's father and mother were employed. (Eval., 
Tr. 27 and 50) 
Respondent testified that the relationship 
between Chris and Kacie was very close. (Tr. 63-65) 
Appellant testified that Kacie and Chris "do all right 
together" and that he didn't "think it's right that 
they be split up unless the circumstances called for." 
(Tr. 38 and 40) Appellant at one point referred to 
Chris and Kacie as "our children." (Tr. 45) Appellant 
had not adopted Chris be~ause he felt it was a ploy to 
get support payments. Appellant felt he had been 
"initially too hard on Chris" and "hurt his personality" 
4 
"'"'J '"';>,ri>Lted that. (E.:val.l 
Apµellanr testified, however, that he felt 
i.L woutd not be in the best interest of Kacie to live 
with 1~hri s, "because of Melody's background and the 
way Melody has turned out, being around that environ-
ment It's not right to have a child around 
that kind of environment, in my eyes." (Tr. 48-49) 
On cross examination, Appellant then testified to 
havi.ng been involved with drugs during the time he 
lived with Kacie, Melody and Chris as a family. (Tr. 
49) 
Appellant called two witnesses to testify 
to the "circumstances" and "environment" to which 
he generally referred. Charles Johnson testified 
to having seen Respondent in a bar with Kacie. (Tr. 
54-551 Respondent testifed that on one occasion 
she had taken Kacie with her to return some milk 
bottles to a woman who worked in a bar, rather than 
leave Kacie alone in the car. (Tr. 61, 20-21) 
John Chidester, Sr., testified that he 
thought a Rex Stromberg spent the night with Respon-
dent, but he "wouldn't go so far as to say he had 
moved anything in." ITr. 60) Respondent testified 
rhdr ~tromberg had not moved in, but sometimes spent 
lhe night there. Respondent testified that her bed-
room was at one end of the mobile home and the chil-
5 
dren's bedrooms were at the other end. Respondent 
testified that at no instance did either child ob-
serve she and Stromberg in the bedroom. (Tr. 62-63) 
Respondent testified that she understood that in 
the event the trial court granted her custody, the 
overnight behavior was going to have to cease and 
desist. (Tr. 21-22) 
The trial court struggled with the custody 
issue: 
THE COURT: Well, this is not an easy 
case on custody, I think. 
The question of the best interest of 
this child and whether--
On the one hand, you have the very im-
portant relationship between the little girl 
and her brother--which I think is very im-
portant and shouldn't be--the two shouldn't 
be separated, except for very compelling 
reasons. 
On the other hand, I don't think it's 
really going to do any good to enter some 
kind of an order that the plaintiff not 
take the child into bars or not have her 
boyfriend stay over, things like that. 
I think it;s evident that if she wants to 
do those things, she's going to do them. 
If she's not going to refrain from doing 
them while the custody hearing is pending, 
certainly she's not going to afterwards. 
And it's evident that the court order is not 
going to keep her from doing those things. 
The question is: Which is really the 
most important and how do you weigh that. 
I'm not so sure I know the answer to it. (Tr. 75-761 
The trial court found it in the best interests 
of the child, Kacie Lynn Leetham, to award custody 
to Respondent, subject to the reasonable visitation 
rights of the Appellant. ITr. 761 The trial court 
admonished Respondent regarding her conduct: 
6 
THE COURT: I want her to know that--
although I'm not entering a specific order 
about that--that in the event that that kind 
of behavior is evident, that will be taken 
into consideration by the court at any sub-
:::equent petition for a modification, that 
the plaintiff can--or the defendant can 
petition for a modification in the decree if 
it appears that the child's best interests 
are not being served and if the environ-
ment in which she's being raised is not ap-
propriate. 
I think she probably understands that 
and I'm sure her attorney will advise her 
of that. That doesn't need to be part of 
the order but goes without saying. (Tr. 79) 
Respondent has had custody of Kacie from 
that time forward. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT RESPONDENT'S HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONS 
WITHOUT MARRIAGE HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON 
THE PARTIES' TWO-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED RESPONDENT PERMANENT 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. 
§30-3-10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1977, reads: 
In any case of separation of husband 
and wife having minor children, or wherever 
a marriage is declared void or dissolved 
the court shall make such order for the 
future care and custoay of the minor chil-
dren as it may deem just and proper. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider 
rhe best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties. 
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.Zd 510 
11979), Chief Justice Hall noted: 
" ... the trial court is given particularly 
broad discretion in the area of child custody 
inc~aent to separation or divorce proceedings. 
: Footnote omitted.) A determination of the 
"best interests of the child" frequently turns 
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on numerous factors which the trial court is 
best suited to assess, given its proximity to 
the parties and the circumstances. Only where 
the trial court action is so flagrantly un-
just as to constitute an abuse of discretion 
should the appellate forum interpose its own 
discretion." 599 P.2d at 511-512. 
In Jorgensen, this Court found no abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court. 
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 
P.2d 561 (1983), Justice Durham, writing for the 
Court, found no abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court faced with an extremely difficult 
decision regarding custody: 
. . The trial court was in an advantaged 
position in dealing with the witnesses and 
the parties and, "(o)nly where (the) trial 
court('s) action is so flagrantly unjust as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion should 
the appellate forum interpose its own judg-
ment." Jorfensen v. Jorgensen, Utah 599 
P.2d 510, 5 2 (1979) See also, ~, Nilson 
v. Nilson, Utah 652 P.2d 1323 (llffi2). -sUCll" 
is not the case here." 
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, Utah 649 P.2d 
38 (1982), Justice Oaks, writing for a unanimous 
Court, listed some of the numerous factors which 
the trial court is best suited to assess. 
"Some factors the court may consider 
in determining the child's best interests 
relate primarily to the child's feelings 
or special needs: the preference of the 
child; keeping siblings together; the rela-
tive strength of the child's bond with one 
or both of the prospective custodians; and, 
in appropriate cases, the general interest 
in continuing previously determined custody 
8 
arrangements where the child is happy and 
well adjusted. Other factors relate pri-
marl ly to the prospective custodians' char-
acter or status or to their capacity or wil-
lingness to function as parents: moral 
character and emotional stability; duration 
and depth of desire for custody; ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate care; 
significant impairment of ability to func-
tion as a parent through drug abuse, exces-
sive drinking, or other cause; reasons for 
having relinquished custody in the past; 
religious compatibility with the child; kin-
ship, including, in extraordinary circum-
stances, stepparent status; and financial 
condition. (These factors are not necessarily 
listed in order of importance.)" 649 P.2d 
at 41. 
Justice Oaks repeated this Court's deference to the 
trial court's unique opportunity to observe the 
parties and their witnesses: 
"Assessments of the applicability and 
relative weight of the various factors in 
a particular case lie within the discretion 
of the trial court. 'Only where trial court 
action is so flagrantly unjust as to consti-
tllte an abuse of discretion should the appel-
late forum interpose its own judgment.' 
Jorgensen v. JorRensen, Utah, 599 P.2d 
510, 512 (1979). Ibid. 
In Lembach v. Cox, Utah, 639 P.2d 197 
11981\, Justice Howe reiterated the Court's recog-
nit ion in Jorgensen, supra, of" 'the continued vitality 
of a judicial preference for the mother in child 
custody matters, all other things being equal' even 
though the statutory maternal presumption formerly 
contained in §30-3-10 was repealed in 1977." 639 
l'.2d at 200. 
Similarly, in Boals v. Boals, Utah, 664 
9 
P.2d 1191 (1983), Chief Justice Hall recognized the 
prerogative of the trial judge to weigh "the best 
interests of the child, mindful of the usually 
unique role played by a mother in caring for a 
child of tender years. Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 
994 (1975l; Steiger v. Steiger, Utah, 4 U.2d 273, 
293 P.2d 418 (1956)." 
The very important relationship between 
the children in a divorced family received special 
comment by Chief Justice Crockett in Jorgensen, 
supra. 
"One of the principal factors to be 
given consideration is that there may be, 
and in most instances there are, greater 
values to be found in the children being 
together, and in their relationships with 
each other, that are to be found in their 
relationships with their divorced and con-
tentious parents, " 599 P.2d at 512. 
Numerous courts have considered the matter 
of custody where the custodial parent's hetero-
sexual relations without marriage were continuing, 
or apparently continuing, at the date of a custody 
modification determination. 100 A.L.R.3d 625, Modi-
fication of Child Custody Order. The cases cited 
in the article clearly establish a modern trend, 
applicable to initial custody determinations as well, 
toward consideration of whether a meretricious rela-
tionship has a detrimental effect upon the child(renl. 
:!"n ol_<ier cases mere evidence of a mother's 
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moral transgression was sufficient to deprive her 
uf custody .. Wilbanks v. Wilbanks (1965) 220 Ga. 
665, 141 SE2d 161; Harris v. Garmon (1971) 228 Ga. 
413, 185 SE2d 802; Simpson v. Simpson (1974) 233 
Ga. 17, 209 SE2d 611; Otani v. Otani (1927) 29 Hawaii 
866; Vice v. Vice (1939) 192 La. 1002, 190 So. 111; 
Kleinpeter v. Kleinpeter (1935) 182 La. 198, 161 
So. 582; Tulley v. Tulley (1931, Mo.App.) 38S.w.2d291; J. v.' 
(1969, Mo. App.) 446 SW2d 425; Carey v. Carey (1925) 
4 NJMisc. 1, 131 A. 103; Costello v. Costello (1970) 
185 Neb. 396, 176 NW2d 10; Brim v. Brim (1975, Okla. 
App.) 532 P2d 1403; Sullivan v. Sullivan (1963) 
236 Or. 192, 387 P2d 571; Eaton v. Eaton (1961, Pa. l 
3 Adams Co. Leg. J. 67; Bliffert v. Bliffert (1961) 
14 Wis.2d 316, 111 NW2d 188; Bell v. Bell (1980) 
154 Ga.App. 290, 267 SE2d 894; and Shanklin v. 
Shanklin (1979, La.App.) 376 So.2d 1036. 
Recent cases contain language requiring a 
finding as to whether the welfare of the children 
was affected [Hawkins v. Hawkins (1977) 240 Ga. 30, 
359 SE2d 358; Schoonover v. Schoonover (1975, Iowa) 
228 NW2d 31; In Re Marriage of Morton (1976, Iowa) 
244 NW2d 819; Feldman v. Feldman (1974, 2d Dept.) 
45 App.Div.2d 320, 358 NYS2d 507; and Re Marriage of 
01son 11981) 98 lll.App.3d 316, 53 Ill.Dec. 751, 
424 NE2d 386]; whether the children have been in-
11 
jured by their mother's cond11ct or by the relation-
ship [Marchand v. Marchand 11971, La.App.I 246 So.2d 
216, cert.den. 258 La. 769, 247 So.2d 865; Beebe v. 
Beebe (1972, Colo.App.) 503 P2d 634; and Rupp v. 
~ (1979, Pa.Super.) 408 A2d 883); whether there 
was a showing of resulting detriment to the children 
[In Re Marriage of Farris 11979) 69 Ill.App.3d 1042, 
26 Ill.Dec. 608, 388 NE2d 232; Marriage of 
Neidert (19771 28 Or.App. 309, 559 P2d 515; Soldner 
v.Soldner (1979) 69!11.App.3d 97,25 Ill.Dec. 489, 
386 NE2d 1153; Willcutts v. Willcutts (1980) 88 Ill. 
App.3d 813, 43 Ill.Dec. 924, 410 NE2d 1057; Cleeton 
v. Cleeton (1979, La.) 383 So.2d 1231; and Manley 
v. Manley (1980, La.) 389 So.2d 454]; and whether 
there was any effect on the care and treatment of 
the children [Steiner v. Steiner (1978) 257 Pa. 
Super. 457, 390 A2d 1326; and Morrissey v. Morrissey, 
(1962,Pa.J9Lebanon Co. Leg. J. 157]. 
This Court recently has considered the mat-
ter of custody where the custodial parent's hetero-
sexual relations without marriage were continuing, or 
apparently continuing, at the date of a custody deter-
mination. Martinez v. Martinez, Utah, 652 P.2d 934 
(19821 and ShioJi v. Shioji, Utah, 671 P.2d 135 
( 1983). 
In Martinez, Justice Howe affirmed the 
12 
'r· 1 al court's change of custody from the mother to 
,. ; '" tar_ her, where trial evidence established that 
the child had been adversely affected by highly 
detrimental circumstances in the mother's home. 
The mother had stated to one witness that her live-
ln boyfriend had a drug problem and that he was 
"lousing up" the child's life. Several other wit-
nesses observed that the child was nervous, unsure 
of herself, unhappy and cried frequently. Frequent 
quarrels between the mother and her boyfriend caused 
the mother to move with the child to the home of 
the mother's sister. The welfare of the child had 
been affected, the child had been injured by the 
relationship, there was a showing of resulting detri-
ment to the child and the evidence suggested that 
there may have been an effect on the care and treat-
ment of the child. This Court found no abuse of 
discretion warranting reversal. 
In Shioji, supra, the Court vacated the 
trial court's order changing custody of two daugh-
ters from their mother to their father on the sole 
ground of the overnight presence in the mother's 
home of her boyfriend. Justice Durham, concurring 
Mnd dissenting, noted that there was no trial evi-
dence whatsoever of any detrimental effect on the 
the appellant's parenting skills or on the children 
13 
themselves as a result uf lh~ uccasinnal overnight 
visits. 
.Justice Durham wrote in Shioji: 
"The 'best interests of the child' 
standard is one which requires a thorough 
and careful exploration of many factors, 
including long-term relationships with a 
primary caretaker, stability in placement, 
parenting skills and styles, employment and 
child-care schedules, as well as the pre-
sence in the- home of other persons (friends, 
step-parents or other relatives). I be-
lieve the trial court erred in basing its 
order changing custody on the sole factor 
of an inappropriate overnight visitation 
practice. While we do not condone such a 
practice, we have frequently noted such 
'illicit' relationships must be shown to 
have a detrimental effect on the interests 
of the children before they can be the 
predicate for a deprivation of custody. 
See, e.g., Kallas v. Kallas, Utah, 614 
P.2d 641 (19801. Ifie language in Chief 
Justice Hall's dissent in Nielsen v. Nielsen, 
Utah, 620 P.2d 511 (1980), is entirely ap-
plicable to this case: 
Although the record contains 
no formal findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, the evidence pre-
sented appears to support the trial 
judge's apparent conclusion that de-
fendant's lifestyle, both economic 
and moral, is somewhat inferior to 
that of the plaintiff. However, 
the record is devoid of any evidence 
whatsoever to the effect, if any, of 
defendant's lifestyle upon the best 
interests of Jimmy. Thus, it becomes 
further apparent that the trial judge 
simply drew a broad inference, without 
any evidence in support thereof, that 
the defendant's lifestyle did, in fact, 
adversely affect the best interests 
of her son. 
In light of the highly equitable 
nature of custody proceedings, I deem 
it an injustice to base an order chang-
ing custody on such a broad inference 
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sr:anding alone. 
ld at 513 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). Chief 
lustire Hall continued: 
In regard to the immoral conduct 
of the defendant, such behavior is 
not to be considered in a vacuum. 
Again, the focus must be upon the best 
interests of the child, and in the ab-
sence of a showing of an adverse effect 
upon those interests, a basis for a 
change of custody is not made out. 
As this Court stated the matter in 
Stuber v. Stuber, (121 Utah 632, 244 
P.Zd 650 (1952)]: 
The fact that she lived with a 
man whom she expected to marry, al-
though censurable, does not in and 
of itself make her an unfit and im-
proper person to have the custody of 
her child. 
Id. at 514 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). See also 
Robinson v. Robinson, 15 Utah 2d 193, 391 P.2d 
434 ( 1964). 
Section 30-3-10 requires the trial court to 
consider the best interests of the child, as well as 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
the parties. Recent Utah case law has enumerated fac-
tors determinative of the best interests of the child 
and factors which contribute to an assessment of the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the 
parties. The burden falls on the trial court to as-
sess and weigh both sets of factors brought into play 
bv the evidence in the light of its observations of 
the parties and their witnesses. The law requires 
onlv that the evidence preponderate in favor of one 
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party in a custody determination. Only where 
the trial court action is so flagrantly unjust 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion should 
the appellate forum interpose its own discretion. 
Such is not the case here. 
The Case at Bar 
It cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding permanent custody 
of the parties' two-year-old daughter to Respon-
dent. The trial court was presented with favorable 
and unfavorable evidence regarding both Appellant 
and Respondent on the issues of the best interests 
of Kacie and on the issue of the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of the parties. 
With regard to the factors determinative 
of the best interests of the little girl, both parties 
testified to the close relationship that existed be-
tween Kacie and Chris. The trial court expressed its 
concern for the "very important relationship between 
the little girl and her brother--which I think is very 
important and shouldn't be--the two shouldn't be sepa-
rated, except for very compelling reasons." 
In her report, the evaluator observed that 
"(w)ith Kacie, Richard appeared very comfortable with 
physical contact and Kacie climbed into his lap and 
fell asleep during the interview." In her recommenda-
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• 1 ,,. , h"'"""""'r, the evaluator apparently felt the 
,1_.~1.i'-t'1 of Kacie's bond with Respondent was the 
'>•'.rongec Jhe evaluator wrote: 
"Melody Leetham does have a 
ctnse, affectionate relationship with her 
children and it is recommended that she be 
awarded permanent custody of Kacie Leetham." 
With regard to previously determined cus-
tody arrangements, Kacie had been with her mother, 
the Respondent, all of her life, except for the few 
days Appellant had taken six-week-old Kacie away 
from her mother. Respondent had had temporary custody 
of Kacie for almost one year at the time of the di-
vorce trial, and had devoted herself almost exclu-
sively to her children for six months when unemployed. 
With respect to the past conduct and demon-
strated moral standards of the parties, the evidence 
was somewhat less conclusive. Respondent had demon-
strated the depth of her desire to have Kacie with 
her when she reconciled with Appellant rather than 
be separated trom her six-week-old baby daughter. 
Respondent had taken a voluntary lay off from her 
jub in parr to spend more time with her children. 
RPsponrient had cared for her Kacie and Chris for all 
thf~jr lives 
Respondent was able to provide Kacie with 
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a great amount of personal rather than surrogate 
care, Appellant, on the other hand, was very busy 
with his job, his union presidency and his classes 
at Trade Tech. His mother would probably have 
been taking care of Kacie when she would not have 
been working Other surrogate care arrangements 
would have to have been made when Appellant's mother 
would have been at work. 
Financially, both parties appeared capable 
of providing for Kacie. Although unemployed at the 
time of trial, Respondent expected to be recalled 
to work at any time. When working, Respondent earned 
slightly more per hour than Appellant. 
The evidence regarding Appellant's psychi-
atric history, his use of drugs in the past, the evalu-
ator's observations that it seemed to be an effort for 
Appellant to keep his voice and emotions under control, 
and discrepancies regarding the financial declaration 
Appellant submitted to the trial court might have raised 
questions in the trial court's mind as to any impairment 
of Appellant's ability to function as a parent. Cer-
tainly, that evidence had a bearing on the trial court's 
assessment of Appellant's moral character and emotional 
stability. 
The evidence regarding Respondent's relation-
ship with Rex Stromberg was called to the trial court's 
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"1·. t Pnt '"n throughout the trial. No evidence was 
preseuted, however, as to any adverse effect of the 
reJationshi.p on Kacie or on Respondent's ability to 
function as a parent. Respondent's admission that 
she took Kacie into a bar on one occasion to return 
some milk bottles rather than leave her alone in the 
car was considered as well in its assessment of 
Respondent's moral character and any impairment of 
Respondent's ability to function as a parent. No 
evidence was presented reflecting adversely on Re-
spondent's emotional stability. 
The evidence clearly preponderates in favor 
of Respondent. Whether the trial court considered 
the judicial preference for the mother in regard to 
the custody of two-year-old Kacie is not apparent 
from the record. It cannot be said, in any event, 
rhat the trial court abused its discretion in award-
ing permanent custody of Kacie Lynn Leetham to her 
mother, Melody Leetham. 
Appellant cites Utah cases where this Court 
has affirmed the trial court's award of custody to 
the father after weighing all evidence, including 
the mother's moral transgressions. Appellant can 
cite no Utah case, however, where this Court has 
found an abuse of discretion on the part of a trial 
court and has reversed the trial court's award of 
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custody. 
The trial cou1L here struggled with the 
custody decision ;ind admitted, "Well, this is not 
an easy case on custody, I think." The trial court 
considered the factors bearing on the issue of the 
best interests of the child, Kacie Lynn Leetham, 
and the factors bearing on the issue of the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the 
parties. The trial court recognized its duty to 
assess the evidence and weigh the various factors. 
The trial court stated, "The question is: Which is 
really the most important and how do you weigh that. 
I'm not so sure I know the answer to it." 
Based upon the evidence before it and 
with due consideration for the difficulty of the task 
ao hand, the trial court nevertheless reached its 
decision. The trial court awarded permanent custody 
of Kacie Lynn Leetham to Respondent. The trial 
court recognized the necessity to admonish Respondent 
regarding her conduct. Tacitly, the trial court 
appeared to recognize that to deprive Respondent of 
custody would punish the child by denying her a 
mother's care and that would not serve the best in-
terests of the child. This Court should affirm the 
trial court's award of permanent custody to Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 30-3-10 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1977, 
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requires the trial court in a custody determination 
ru consider the best interests of the children, as 
wet.I. as the past conduct and demonstrated moral stan-
dards of the parties. The trial court here considered 
the evidence relating to the factors determinative 
of the best interests of Kacie Lynn Leetham and the 
evidence bearing on the issue of the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of the parties, including 
Appellant's psychiatric and drug abuse history and 
Respondent's meretricious relationship with another 
man. The trial court may have indulged a judicial 
preference for the mother in the matter of the custody 
of a child of tender years. 
This Court has demonstrated its deference to 
the trial court unique opportunity to assess and weigh 
the evidence in a child custody matter in the light of 
the trial court's observations of the parties and their 
witnesses. This Court has not reversed a trial court's 
determination of custody on a finding of an abuse of 
discretion, even in difficult cases. 
The modern trend in the case law of other 
states and the case law of Utah requires a finding 
as to whether the welfare of the children has been 
adversely affected, whether the children have been 
inJured by their mother's conduct or by the relation-
ship, whether there has been a showing of resulting 
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detriment to the children ot whether there has been 
any adverse effect on the care and treatment of the 
children. No evidence was presented to the trial 
court which would support any such finding in the 
instant case. 
This Court must affirm the determination 
made by the trial court after due deliberation and 
consideration of all the evidence that Respondent 
be awarded the permanent care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor daug~, Kacie Lynn Leetham. 
DATED this ,2~ day of January, 1984. 
Submitted, 
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